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The treaty of Lagos emerged in 1975 proposing a union of West African states. The treaty was 
initially meant for economic integration but a wave of political reforms and civil strife in the region 
led to its revision. This led to an expansion of its scope and powers to include political integration.1  
In 1999, to expand its mandate, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
adopted the Protocol on Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, 
Peacekeeping and Security (hereinafter Protocol on Mechanism for Conflict Prevention). This was 
adopted in line with the United Nations Charter’s chapter on the exception of the use of force2, 
provisions that allow use of force in the African Union Charter3 and ECOWAS protocols that 
provide for members to give each other mutual assistance for defence against any armed threat.4 
There was need for the regional body to develop policies to protect civilians due to an increase in 
protracted domestic conflicts in the region and restore life to normalcy after conflicts. The Protocol 
outlines its objectives which include maintaining and consolidating peace, security and stability 
within the community5 and the constitution and deployment of a civilian or military force to 
maintain or restore peace within the region when the need arises.6  
 In case of conflict, the procedure set out for intervention includes recourse to the Council of elders, 
the dispatch of fact-finding missions, political and mediation missions or as a last resort military 
intervention.7 The circumstances that permit intervention are not left open but are clearly defined 
by the Protocol on Mechanism for Conflict Prevention. These are  in cases of aggression or conflict 
in any Member State or threat , in case of conflict between two or several Member States, in case 
of internal conflict that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster or that poses a serious threat to 
peace and security in the sub-region, in event of serious and massive violation of human rights and 
                                                          
1 Hartmann, Christof, ‘ECOWAS and the Restoration of Democracy in The Gambia’ 52(1) Africa Spectrum, 2017, 
88. 
2 Chapter VI, VII & VIII, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
3 Article 4H, Constitutive Act of the African Union, 1 July 2000. 
4 Preamble, Protocol on Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace keeping and Security, 
10 December 1999. 
5 Article 3(e), Protocol on Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace keeping and Security. 
6 Article 3(h), Protocol on Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace keeping and Security. 
7 Article 27, Protocol on Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace keeping and Security. 
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the rule of law, in the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected 
government and any other situation as may be decided by the Mediation and Security Council.8  
In 2016, The Gambia had their general elections in which Adama Barrow was declared the 
winner.9 The former president Yahya Jammeh before the official announcement conceded defeat 
and congratulated Barrow vowing that he would not contest the results.10 Later, Jammeh changed 
his earlier position claiming that he no longer had faith in the electoral system; would contest the 
results and due to the irregularities in aggregation of results from one region, he would ask for 
fresh elections under a different electoral administration.11 Troops were then deployed on the 
streets of Banjul.12At this point it was clear that Jammeh was no longer committed to handing over 
power to the president elect. 
In a joint statement on 10 December, ECOWAS, African Union (AU) and United Nations 
Organisation of West African States (UNOWAS) called on the government of The Gambia to 
abide by its constitutional responsibilities and international obligations.13 Placing emphasis on the 
importance of security for the president elect and the Gambian citizens.14 Also supported Senegal’s 
position, a non-permanent member of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) at that time, on 
the issue with regards to calling on an emergency meeting of the UNSC.15 
The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a meeting on 12 December and made a decision 
on the situation in The Gambia. This was in reference to the AU Constitutive Act as well as the 
AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance provisions on the total rejection by the AU 
of unconstitutional changes of government.16 The PSC decided that a high level delegation be 
formed to engage all Gambian stakeholders concerned to help facilitate peaceful transfer of 
                                                          
8 Article 25, Protocol on Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace keeping and Security. 
9 - http://www.africanews.com/2016/12/02/adama-barrow-officially-declared-winner-of-gambia-s-presidential-
election//> on 15 August 2017. 
10- https://jollofnews.com/2016/12/02/gambia-2016-jammeh-reacts-to-election-defeat/ >on 15 August 2017. 
11- https://jollofnews.com/2016/12/21/gambia-election-2016-our-position-on-the-political-standoff/ >on 15 August 
2017.  
12 Hartmann, Christof, ‘ECOWAS and the Restoration of Democracy in The Gambia’, 87. Interpreted as an act of 
Jammeh signifying that he was still in control of the security apparatus. 
13 - http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-african-union-and-un-statement-on-the-political-developments-in-the-gambia/> 
on 16 August 2017. 
14 - http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-african-union-and-un-statement-on-the-political-developments-in-the-gambia/> 
on 16 August 2017. 
15 - http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-election-senegal/senegal-calls-for-u-n-security-council-meeting-over-
gambia-idUSKBN13Z00K> on 16 August 2017. 
16 Article 23(4), African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 30 January 2007. Focus being on 
the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning candidate after a free and fair election as 
provided for in the Charter. 
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power.17PSC also decided to pursue and intensify coordinating efforts with ECOWAS and United 
Nations (UN) to facilitate the transfer of power to the president elect.18 In their decision, PSC 
emphasised that the AU was determined to take all necessary measures in line with the relevant 
AU instruments to ensure that the will and desire of The Gambian people is respected and 
complied.19 
The position change by Jammeh, according to ECOWAS, threatened the peace of the entire West 
African sub-region. This made ECOWAS send a mediation delegation to The Gambia.20 The UN 
special representative for West Africa, when asked whether the UN would consider military action 
if mediation failed said that it would not be necessary depending on the situation at the time.21 
Mediation failed convincing ECOWAS heads of states to adopt more credible sanctions.22 
ECOWAS decided that it will take all necessary measures to strictly enforce the election results.23 
As a sub- regional body it would also request the UNSC and AU to endorse and support all its 
decisions on the Gambian situation.24 ECOWAS then placed standby forces on alert so that they 
would intervene militarily if Jammeh did not step down by 19 January. 
On 21 December the president of the UNSC made a statement after the UNSC had considered 
Peace in West Africa during their 7848th meeting. The statement reiterated the UNSC’s full 
support for the continued efforts of AU and ECOWAS to promote peace and stability and good 
governance in the sub- region.25 
The AU Peace and Security Council at its 647 meeting on 13 January 2017 adopted another 
decision on the Gambian situation. The council reaffirmed AU’s zero tolerance policy with regard 
to coup d’état and unconstitutional changes of government.26 It declared that as of 19 January the 
AU will no longer recognize Jammeh as the legitimate president.27  
                                                          
17 PSC/PR/COMM. (DCXLIV) (2016) Post-election situation In the Islamic Republic of Gambia, 2.  
18 PSC/PR/COMM. (DCXLIV) (2016), 2. 
19 PSC/PR/COMM. (DCXLIV) (2016), 3. 
20 - http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/african-leaders-head-gambia-mediation-talks-161212144241777.html> 
on 20 August 2017. 
21 Farge E and McAllister E, ‘Gambia’s Jammeh must leave power when term ends: United Nations’ Reuters 14 
December < http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-election/gambias-jammeh-must-leave-power-when-term-
ends-united-nations-idUSKBN1431IU> on 22 August 2017. 
22 Hartmann, Christof, ‘ECOWAS and the Restoration of Democracy in The Gambia’, 
23 ECOWAS Final Communique 17 December 2016. 
24 ECOWAS Final Communique 17 December 2016. 
25 Press statement UNSC 21 December 2016. 
26 PSC/PR/COMM. (DCXLVII) (2017) Post-election situation In the Islamic Republic of Gambia, 3. 
27 PSC/PR/COMM. (DCXLVII) (2017), 3. 
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On 14 January, the defence chiefs of ECOWAS gathered. In the meeting they discussed the 
establishment of the ECOWAS Military Intervention in The Gambia (ECOMIG). The troops 
would be deployed in The Gambia to install the new president.28 At the end of the meeting no 
communique was issued.29 
On 18 January, troops started to move to the Senegal-Gambia border. The following day, Barrow 
was sworn in as president in the Gambian embassy in Dakar, Senegal. In his inaugural speech, he 
asked AU, UN and ECOWAS to assist Gambians in enforcing their will.30 
The UNSC on the same day approved resolution 2337.31 It expressed full support of ECOWAS’s 
quest to ensure by political means first that power was handed over to president elect Barrow. 
Initially it had referred to ECOWAS’ use of all necessary measures but this was dropped as 
members such Russia objected to any reference supporting military action. Russia’s deputy 
ambassador Iliichev told reporters that Barrow had the option of requesting military assistance if 
diplomacy fails.32 Britain’s deputy UN ambassador Peter Wilson in his statement said that it was 
clear that if Barrow asked for assistance as the legitimate president, he would be entitled to it.33 
The military invasion was quickly halted to allow final negotiations. Due to the circumstances 
such as the military invasion, Gambians fleeing and Jammeh’s own army chief pledging allegiance 
to President Barrow, Jammeh agreed to step down.34 
 
1.2 Central Problem 
By being party to ECOWAS treaty states have consented to military interventions based on the 
Protocol on Mechanism for Conflict Prevention. Western Africa states were willing to militarily 
intervene in The Gambia based on this legal claim of a prior treaty based consent.35 Senegal, as a 
                                                          
28-<http://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/01/16/the-gambia-use-of-force-imminent-as-ecowas-plans-to-oust-
jammeh/> on 30 August 2017. 
29 -<http://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/01/16/the-gambia-use-of-force-imminent-as-ecowas-plans-to-oust-
jammeh/> on 30 August 2017.  
30 - http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/gambia-president-adama-barrow-takes-oath-senegal-
170119170745954.html> on 30 August 2017.  
31 UNSC S/RES/2337 (2017) Peace Consolidation in West Africa. 
32 - http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-4137146/UN-vote-resolution-supporting-Barrow-Gambia-
leader.html> on 30 August 2017. 
33- https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-people-of-the-gambia-spoke-clearly-at-the-elections-in-december-
they-chose-adama-barrow-to-be-their-president > on 30 August 2017. 
34 Hartmann, Christof, ‘ECOWAS and the Restoration of Democracy in The Gambia’, 90. 
35 Kress C and Nussberger B, ‘Pro-democratic intervention in current international law: The case of The Gambia in 
January 2017’ Journal on the Use of Force and international Law, 2017, 7 - 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2017.1338466> on 1 September 2017. 
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non-permanent member of the UNSC, did not comment on the threat of use of force by its troops 
who crossed the Gambian border at midnight on 19 January before UNSC’s authorization.36 This 
same idea of use of force based on ECOWAS treaty is not present in resolution 2337. UNSC’s 
permanent members Russia and UK authorizing ECOWAS to use of force relied exclusively on 
intervention through invitation.37 This raises the question of the constitutionality of the threat or 
use of force in the West African security framework and how it relates with the collective security 
system of the UN.38 
 
1.3 Hypothesis 
Proximity to conflicts in Africa makes regional organisations most suitable to maintain peace and 
security in Africa. 
Because Article 3 and Article 25 of The Protocol on Mechanism for Conflict Prevention permit 
ECOWAS to use force without prior UNSC authorization, they violate Article 53 of the Charter 
of the United Nations. 
UNSC’s silence, open support and not objecting to the use of force by African states reflects the 
futility of the prior authorization requirement in Article 53 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
1.4 Chapter Breakdown   
This study is broken down into six chapters. The current chapter being an introduction with the 
details of the background to the problem, the research problem, the hypothesis and the 
methodology used during the study. In Chapter 2, a discussion on Third World Approaches to 
International Law as the theoretical framework for this study. Chapter 3 is on the formation of 
international law on use of force. Chapter 4 analyses the role of regional organisations in 
enforcement action. Chapter 5 looks at ECOWAS laws on use of force and AU laws on use of 
                                                          
36Kress C and NuBberger B, ‘Pro-Democratic intervention in current international law: the case of The Gambia in 
January 2017, 7. 
37- http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-4137146/UN-vote-resolution-supporting-Barrow-Gambia-
leader.html > on 30 August 2017. 
38Kress and Nussberger B, ‘Pro-democratic intervention in current international law: the case of The Gambia in 
January 2017, 7. 
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force and instances where ECOWAS has resorted to force and UNSC’s reaction to the use of force. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, we conclude with our findings and recommendations.  
1.5 Methodology  
“It is a capital mistake to theorise before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit 
theories, instead of theories to suit facts.” Sherlock Holmes39 
The research was mainly desk-based. Focusing on interpretation of various treaties, resolutions 
and decisions on the use of force by UN and ECOWAS. In a bid to establish state practice on use 
of force at both levels. Other sources such as books and journal articles were also useful. They 
helped in expounding and analysing state practice on use of force.  For the theoretical framework 













                                                          
39 Hodgson P. ‘What user researchers can learn from Sherlock Holmes’12 April 
2015<http://www.userfocus.co.uk/articles/learn_from_Sherlock_Holmes.html> on 31 August 2017. 
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2. THIRD WORLD APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (TWAIL) 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter one was a background on the recent threat of use of force by ECOWAS in The Gambia. 
From the background it is seen that ECOWAS may resort to force when there is a threat to peace 
and security in West Africa. The basis of using force being the Protocol on Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention and not Security Council authorization. 
This chapter introduces TWAIL as the theoretical framework for this study. TWAIL supports the 
argument that UN should no longer have monopoly power on the use of force in the world. The 
chapter proceeds by first explaining what TWAIL as a theory entails by tracing its history. As part 
of understanding the theory there is an explanation of the meaning of third world states and reasons 
for this theory. The second part looks at the two classes of TWAIL. A fight against structural 
discrimination and as state practice. The third part is on the criticisms of TWAIL and a proposed 
solution to these criticisms. The final part concludes this chapter by linking TWAIL and use of 
force. It advances that, based on TWAIL as state practice, regional organisations should be the 
ones to maintain peace and security in Africa. 
2.2 What is TWAIL? 
 It originated as a decentralized network of academics who shared a common commitment in their 
concern about the third world.40 They wanted to critically review the work of the first generation 
of public international law scholars from the third world41, and they were particularly interested in 
engaging the universal claims made by public international law.42  
Currently, TWAIL is understood as a body of academic knowledge that is part of a number of 
critical43 schools of international legal thought.44 TWAIL amongst other things re-examines the 
                                                          
40 Gathii J, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network and a Tentative Bibliography’ 3(1) 
Trade Law and Development (2011), 27. 
41 An example would be Taslim Olawale Elias. Toufyan M, ‘When British Justice (in African Colonies) Points Two 
Ways: On Dualism, Hybridity, and the Genealogy of Juridical Negritude in Taslim Olawale Elias’ in Onazi O, 
African Legal Theory and Contemporary Problems Critical Essays, Springer, New York, 2014. 
42 Gathii J, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network and a Tentative Bibliography’, 27-28. 
43Chimni B, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World Approach’ 8 Melbourne 
Journal of International Law (2007), 500-501. 
44Chimni B, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World Approach’, 501. 
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historical foundations of international law.45This includes the colonial encounter between 
Europeans and non-Europeans.46 Leading to the conclusion that imperial expansion, to subordinate 
non-European peoples, heavily relied on construction and universalization of international law.47 
International law, according to TWAIL, regardless of its guarantees of sovereign equality and self-
determination carries forward the legacy of imperialism and colonial conquest.48 TWAIL thus 
challenges the complacency in international law to treat this colonial legacy as dead letter because 
of decolonization.49 
 2.2.1 Why TWAIL? 
The international law regime is state-centric i.e. states-and only states- are true legislators of 
international law.50 The function of international courts is to interpret while “publicists” expound 
upon concepts and provide scientific analysis. On the other hand non-state actors such as the civil 
society and corporations influence the drafting of international instruments.51 They also constitute, 
by far, the majority of complainants to international jurisdictions.52 To find international 
legislation, it is to states, and their explicit legislative action and customary practice that we look.53 
Thus the approach of third world states to international law cannot be excluded as these states have 
created a distinct approach to practice of international law.54 
Third world international law scholars still have a great task before them. To map the changes that 
have occurred between states and international law.55 They should focus on the major overlapping 
developments redefining and reconstituting the relationship of state, international law and 
institutions which may have a different impact on third world states and peoples.56 This research 
attempts to fulfill this task. 
                                                          
45 Gathii J, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network and a Tentative Bibliography’, 30. 
46 Gathii J, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network and a Tentative Bibliography’, 30. 
47 Mutua M, ‘What is TWAIL?’ 94 American Society of International Law (2000), 31. 
48 Gathii J, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network and a Tentative Bibliography’, 30-31. 
49 Gathii J, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network and a Tentative Bibliography’, 30. 
50 Personal communication with Sipalla H on 10 January 2018. 
51 Personal communication with Sipalla H on 10 January 2018. 
52 Personal communication with Sipalla H on 10 January 2018.    
53 Personal communication with Sipalla H on 10 January 2018. 
54 Personal communication with Sipalla H on 10 January 2018. 
55Chimni B, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’ 8 International Community Law Review 
(2006), 8. 
56 Chimni B, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’, 8. 
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2.2.2 The meaning of third world 
The category third world is made up of various countries with different cultures, historical 
differences and varying economic levels.57 However, too much is often made of numbers, 
variations and differences in the presence of structures and processes of global capitalism which 
continues to bind and unite.58These are the structures that produced colonialism and have now led 
to neo-colonialism.59 Therefore, third world comes from a common history of subjection to 
colonialism and/or the continuing underdevelopment and marginalization of countries in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America.60 
The process of aggregating, in international law, a diverse set of countries with differences in their 
patterns of economy also validates the category ‘third world’.61 International law prescribes rules 
that ignore the uneven development of states in a bid to prescribe uniform global standards.62 Third 
world acts as the response to these abstractions and crucial to organizing and offering collective 
resistance to hegemonic policies.63 A level of unity that would enable resistance to a range of 
practices which systematically disadvantage and subordinate an otherwise diverse group of 
people.64 
The category third world is still relevant today because of the growing north-south divide.65 It 
serves as a pointer to certain structural constraints that the world economy imposes on one set of 
countries as opposed to others.66 
2.3 Classes of TWAIL 
a) TWAIL as essentially a fight against structural discrimination67 
International law has European and Christian origins as asserted by its creators.68 Their claim being 
international law is premised on Europe as the centre, Christianity as the basis for civilization, 
                                                          
57 Chimni B, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’, 4. 
58 Chimni B, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’, 4. 
59 Chimni B, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’, 4. 
60 Chimni B, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’, 5. 
61 Chimni B, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’, 5. 
62 Chimni B, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’, 5. 
63 Chimni B, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’, 5. 
64 Chimni B, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’, 5. 
65 Chimni B, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’, 5. 
66 Chimni B, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’, 5. 
67 Personal communication with Sipalla H on 10 January 2018. 
68 Mutua M, ‘What is TWAIL?’, 33. 
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capitalism as innate in humans and imperialism as a necessity.69 Nonetheless, the concept of 
international law was not alien to non-Western world.70 The idea that international law was simply 
a product of European Christian civilization has been dispelled.71  
Necessities of colonialism is what led to the development of international law in crucial areas such 
as territory acquisition, state responsibility, recognition and state succession.72 Colonialism was 
justified, managed and legitimized by the international law principle of sovereignty.73 For example 
sovereign statehood, as defined by European powers, was the difference between freedom and the 
conquest and occupation of a people or society.74 Third world people and their territory were 
reduced into mere objects of international law.75 They only became subjects of international law 
while surrendering their sovereignty to colonisers.76 This moment of empowerment was only one 
of complete subjection marked by death, destruction, pillage, plunder and humiliation.77  
The end of direct colonial rule started after World War II.78 As third world states gained political 
independence they soon realized it was illusionary.79 Third world states joined the United Nations, 
a body formed to create and maintain global order through peace, security and cooperation among 
states.80 Among the organs of the United Nations are the Security Council and the General 
Assembly the former having primacy over the latter.81 The Security Council is made up of both 
permanent and non-permanent members the big powers being the only permanent members.82 On 
the other hand the general assembly consists of all member states with third world states 
                                                          
69 Mutua M, ‘What is TWAIL?’, 33. 
70 Personal communication with Sipalla H on 10 January 2018. 
71Chimni B, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World Approach’, 500-501. talks 
about the book, An Introduction to the History of the Law of nations in the East Indies.  
72 Chimni B, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World Approach’, 501. Citing 
Mutua M, ‘What is TWAIL?’ 
73 Mutua M, ‘What is TWAIL?’, 33.  
74 Mutua M, ‘What is TWAIL?’, 33. 
75 Chimni B, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World Approach’, 501. 
76 Chimni B, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World Approach’, 501. 
77 Chimni B, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World Approach’, 501. 
78 Mutua M, ‘What is TWAIL?’, 34. 
79 Mutua M, ‘What is TWAIL?’, 34. 
80 Mutua M, ‘What is TWAIL?’, 34. 
81 Mutua M, ‘What is TWAIL?’, 34. 
82 Mutua M, ‘What is TWAIL?’, 34. 
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dominating.83 European hegemony over global affairs was thus just transferred to the big powers- 
United States, Britain, France, Soviet Union and China.84  
Currently international law is just a system that embodies important safeguards for third world 
states such as equality of states but still carries forward the legacy of colonial disempowerment 
and subjugation in the rules relating to various aspects such as use of force.85  
Angie writes a book Imperialism, Sovereignty and Making of International Law in which he puts 
forth this argument.86 His claim is that doctrinal and institutional developments in international 
law cannot be understood as “logical elaborations of a stable philosophically conceived 
sovereignty doctrine... [But rather] as being generated by problems relating to colonial order”.87   
b) TWAIL as Third World State Practice88 
There have been instances where the Third world has used the same colonial tool of inversion of 
intent, demonstrated by TWAIL, to advance their proper subaltern cause.89 The best example 
which relates to this research would be in the prohibition of use of force and political 
interference.90It is known that the illicit US interventions in Latin America were political.91 
Nicaragua lost the political battle against but won the legal battle in its case against the US for its 
support of the Contras92  and their atrocities against Nicaragua and its peoples.93 The loss led to 
US withdrawing its acceptance of compulsory ICJ jurisdiction and used its veto powers in the 
Security Council to evade its reparations obligations towards Nicaragua.94 
                                                          
83 Mutua M, ‘What is TWAIL?’, 34. 
84 Mutua M, ‘What is TWAIL?’, 34. 
85  Gathii J, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network and a Tentative Bibliography’, 
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2.4 Criticism to TWAIL  
The first generation of third world scholars failed to capture the intimate relationship between 
colonialism and international law.95 As a result they imagined the postcolonial state as an agent of 
emancipation yet these states soon came to play a comprador role.96 Scholarship failed to pinpoint 
the class and gender divides within and was unable to realize the growing collaborative character 
of the third world elite.97 This meant that their belief that colonial international law would 
metamorphose into an international law of emancipation was naive optimism.98 
TWAIL has also failed to critique neo-liberal international law and in projecting an alternative 
vision of international law.99 Reasons for this include ideological domination of Northern 
academic institutions, problems of doing research in the poor world and fragmentation of 
international legal studies among other things.100 
 Hence, a more critical approach is necessary for the interests of third world to be safeguarded.101 
As a starting point, there is need for a critique of dominant ideology hand in hand with a theory of 
resistance.102 The theory of resistance has to avoid the pitfalls of liberal optimism on the one hand 
and left wing pessimism on the other. Consequently, TWAIL will also need to find ways and 
means to globalize the sources of this critical knowledge and address the material and ethical 
concerns of third world peoples.103   
2.5 TWAIL and The Use of Force 
Powerful states resorting to force against less powerful states carries with it dangers.104 Force is 
used to manifest their overwhelming military superiority and to quell the possibility of any 
challenge being mounted to their vision of world order.105 Dominant States do not appear to be 
constrained by international law norms, be it with regard to the use of force or the minimum respect 
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for international humanitarian laws.106 Perhaps because dominant states are the permanent 
members of the Security Council.107 An organ of the UN Tasked with the primary responsibility 
of maintaining peace and security giving it monopoly power over use of force.108  The US 
intervention in Nicaragua and the Gulf War and the NATO intervention in Kosovo are just a few 
examples of this truth. Thus, peace in the contemporary world is in many ways the function of 
dominance.109 TWAIL-ers are only too keenly aware about how these uses of force have been used 
to the detriment of third world peoples.110 
 Also the Security Council has not always been able to take decisive action for the maintenance of 
international peace and for resolving international problems.111 Most conflict-stricken states 
happen to be third world states. Therefore, inaction by Security Council prejudices third world 
states. This led to an agitation by third world states for regional organisations to have a right of 




Third world state practice aims to counter Eurocentric international law.  Which has been 
detrimental to third world states on various principles such as use of force. This has led third world 
states to support regional organisations as having primary responsibility of maintaining peace and 
security. Therefore, having the power to use force against and in the territory of a member state to 
achieve peace and security. This can be seen in the various regional organisations treaties. 
However, maintaining peace and security as a primary role of regional organisations as opposed 
to Security Council is prima facie in derogation of UN Charter.  How then do we resolve this? 
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3. FORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE USE OF 
FORCE 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter two was on TWAIL as the theoretical framework for this study. TWAIL, as state practice, 
supports regional organisations as having the primary responsibility of maintaining peace and 
security in Africa. This in turn makes regional organisations a source of authority on the use of 
force. However, this statement is inconsistent with international law on the use of force specifically 
the UN Charter.  
This chapter is about international law on the use of force. It is on the prohibition of the use of 
force. It proceeds by first tracing the law before the UN charter and then after UN charter. 
According to the UN charter the Security Council has the primary responsibility of maintaining 
peace and security in the world. Wielding monopoly power over the use of force. This is the 
Security Council exception to use force. 
3.2 Prohibition against the Use of Force 
Before the formation of the UN there were a number of treaties and customary law that regulated 
the unilateral use of force by states.113 The UN Charter ushered in a new law on the use of force 
but this did not diminish the relevance of the pre-charter law.114 For us to understand the current 
law we need to be aware of the historical development of the law on the use of force.115 
3.2.1 The Law before the UN Charter 
The use of force was in the early days governed by the Just War doctrine.116 This was developed 
by early writers such as St Augustine and Grotius.117 It stipulated that war was illegal unless 
undertaken for a just cause. This would be a wrong received or a right denied.118 After the Peace 
of Westphalia in 1648 the concept of just war disappeared from international law.119 States were 
now sovereign and equal and therefore no state could judge whether another’s cause was just or 
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not.120 The governing doctrine at this time was the sovereign right to resort to war, founded on 
state practice and international law, which would only regulate conduct during war.121 
International relations were governed by the sovereign right to resort to war until the League of 
Nations was formed in 1919.122 States by this time had started classifying use of force according 
to intended purposes such as self defence, reprisal and rescue of nationals abroad.123They claimed 
that force used for these purposes did not amount to war.124  The Covenant of the League of Nations 
introduced a restriction on the sovereign right to resort to war by creating procedural safeguards.125 
War was only lawful if states adhered to the following procedural safeguards laid down in article 
10 to article 16 of the covenant: 
 
1.  The members undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the 
territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.  
2. The League may take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the 
peace of nations.  
3. If there is any dispute states will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement 
or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months 
after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report by the Council. 
4. Establishment of a Permanent Court of Justice to settle disputes between states. 
5. If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, 
which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with Article 13, 
the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council.  
6. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under articles 
12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other 
Members of the League. 
The covenant had two main significant consequences. The right to self defence emerged more 
clearly as a legal exception to the procedural restraints and categories of use of force that did not 
amount to war. States could resort to war based on legal claims rather than political 
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justifications.126 These developments occurred due to the procedural restriction on states earlier 
unlimited legal competence to go to war.127 
In an effort to close the gaps left by the covenant and to achieve total prohibition, there was the 
signing of the General Treaty for the Renunciation of war in 1928.128 Parties to the treaty 
condemned recourse to war and renounced it as an instrument of national policy in their 
relations.129This treaty is still in force.130 It is then clear that prohibition of the resort to war is a 
valid principle in international law.131 Reservations to the treaty by some states made it apparent 
that the right to resort to force in self defence was still a recognized principle in international 
law.132 As such there are instances when the use of force is legal.133 
 
3.2.2 The Law after the UN Charter 
The UN Charter stipulates a general prohibition on the unilateral use of force.134  This principle 
has been reaffirmed many times in a number of general assembly resolutions and declarations as 
we will see below.  
General Assembly resolutions and declarations may contain assertions that a certain action is 
incompatible with a particular norm of UN Charter.135 These assertions of compatibility or 
incompatibility of state conduct with the norms of UN Charter constitute interpretations and 
application of the UN Charter by member states.136 This is how parties to the UN Charter have 
interpreted the general prohibition on the unilateral use of force. 
In the resolution on ‘The Essentials of Peace’ UNGA called upon states to refrain from any threats 
or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing freedom, independence or integrity of any state or at 
fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people.137  
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UNGA, in the Friendly Relations Declaration, proclaimed the principle that states shall refrain in 
their international relations from threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purpose 
of the UN.138 Such a threat or use of force would constitute a violation of International Law and 
the Charter of UN.139The Declaration on Friendly Relations is central to any consideration of 
international law on use of force.140  Its importance was stated by the International Court of Justice 
in the Nicaragua case.141 This is because the Declaration on Friendly Relations represents 
international law.142 A look at the drafting history of the Declaration on the Non-Use of force 
contains repeated affirmations of this.143 Also its status as international law has never been 
challenged by any state.144 
Among the principles to be observed in the declaration ‘Preparation of Societies for a Life in 
Peace’ is that a war of aggression is a crime against peace and it is prohibited in international 
law.145  
By 1983, UNGA was alarmed over the growing tendency of states to resort to force. These states 
were ignoring the UN Charter and Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.146They ephasised that only UN through the 
Security Council was authorised to use force in maintenance of peace and security.147 
‘Right of Peoples to Peace’ declaration emphasised that exercise of the right to peace demanded 
that policies of states be directed towards elimination of the threat of war, particularly nuclear war 
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and  the renunciation of the use of force in international relations on the basis of the Charter of the 
United Nations.148  
The Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the principle of Refraining from the 
Threat or Use of Force in International Relations stated that every State should refrain from threat 
or use of force against territory of another State.149 Other than the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations, this was another major declaration on use of force.150 Questions then arose as to whether 
Declaration on Friendly Relations should be final or this new declaration would have a role.151 The 
Declaration, however, did not have any new important provisions.152 This may be explained by 
the fundamental controversies on the use of force that states failed to resolve.153 One of the major 
controversy that still remains is on the meaning of ‘force’.154 Western states take a much narrower 
view unlike the rest of the world whose view differs on; national liberation movements having the 
right to use force, scope of prohibition of the occupation and acquisition of territory by force, the 
scope of the right to self defence and outlawing of the use of nuclear weapons.155 The drafts 
produced by states for the Declaration on the Non-Use of Force show gaps.156 Working paper from 
the West did not mention disarmament, nuclear weapons, economic and political coercion and 
armed force against colonial and racist domination or propaganda.157 The contrast on these is clear 
on the Non-Aligned working paper.158 
The lack of important new content in the Declaration on the Non- Use of Force does not render it 
valueless.159 The Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly without a vote.160 This makes 
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it have a symbolic value as a unanimous expression by states of the permanent validity of the 
principles it contains.161 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Declaration on the Non-Use of Force 
will attain more than symbolic value.162  
3.3 Security Council and the use of force  
The aim of the drafters of the UN Charter was not only to prohibit the unilateral use of force by 
states but also to centralize control of the use of force in the Security Council under Chapter VII.163 
The formal scheme of Chapter VII is that the Security Council can take provisional measures164 or 
determine that there is a threat to the peace or breach of the peace or act of aggression165 and take 
economic measures 166or take action by air sea or land forces if they consider that measures under 
Article 41 would be inadequate or had proved inadequate.167 The GA at the level of Heads of State 
and Government in its 2005 World Summit Outcome document reaffirmed:  
 “That the relevant provisions of the Charter are sufficient to address the full range of threats to 
international peace and security. We further reaffirm the authority of the Security Council to 
mandate coercive action to maintain and restore international peace and security. We stress the 
importance of acting in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter”.168 
The original contemplation was that states would provide troops for a standing military force at 
the disposal of the Security Council.169 The Security Council would use the standing military force 
to fulfill its functions under article 42 directly.  However, this standing army never materialized 
for reasons largely tied to the Cold War.170 For the Security Council to act by way of Article 42, it 
is now dependent on the will of individual Member States.171 This is because it has emerged, 
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through practice, that member states are the ones to provide fighting forces for the Security Council 
on an ad hoc basis.172  
3.4 Conclusion 
The Security Council, as seen above, has the primary responsibility to maintain international peace 
and security.173 This in turn means that the Security Council is the only authorised body that can 
use force or approve the use of force. Nonetheless, it may delegate this power to regional 
arrangements or regional agencies.174 Regional arrangements may take enforcement action under 
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4. ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN 
ENFORCEMENT ACTION 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we saw that the Security Council has the primary responsibility of 
maintaining peace and security. And as such having monopoly power over the use of force. 
However, Security Council has not always been able to take decisive action for the maintenance 
of international peace and for resolving international problems. This has led the Security Council 
to rely on regional organisations. 
 This chapter analyses regional organisations exception on the use of force. Whereby regional 
organisations may use force if authorised by the Security Council. This then begs the question, 
why should enforcement actions by regional organisations be authorised by Security Council if 
they are the more befitting bodies to maintain peace and security as argued earlier and in this 
chapter? Is it time to accept this law on authorization has evolved through state practice as we will 
see in the next chapter?  
 
4.2 According to the UN Charter 
 Chapter VIII of the UN Charter sets out the role of regional organisations in the overall UN 
framework. The provisions of Chapter VIII have been defined as those which “set out the basic 
principles governing activities of regional arrangements and agencies and establish the legal 
framework for cooperation in the United Nations in the area of maintenance of international peace 
and security.”176 The provisions in this chapter are as a result of a compromise after lengthy 
negotiations between partisans of regionalism and partisans of universalism.177 The Covenant of 
the League of Nations under Articles 20 and 21 had limited the existence of regional 
organisations.178 This changes in the Charter of the United Nations which states in Article 52 that 
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nothing in this Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies.179 However, 
Article 53 serves as a rider to this recognition forbidding any enforcement action by a regional 
organization unless authorized by the Security Council.180 This defines the primacy of the Security 
Council vis-à-vis regional and sub-regional organizations in enforcement action. The Security 
Council has oversight role of activities undertaken under regional arrangements for maintenance 
of peace and security. But what does the charter mean by enforcement action? And what amounts 
to Security Council authorization?  
4.2.1 The meaning of Regional Enforcement Action 
Use of military force by a regional organization on a member state constitutes an enforcement 
action.181 In the original construction, enforcement action was to be equated with the Security 
Council’s UN charter chapter VII powers.182 Enforcement action by regional organisations would 
then include economic sanctions, severance of diplomatic or trade relations or other measures short 
of the use of force.183 This, however, is no longer the case as scholars have concluded that 
economic sanctions or severance of diplomatic relations do not constitute enforcement action 
under article 53 of UN Charter.184  
4.2.2   Nature of Authorisation  
In order for a regional organization to legally engage in an enforcement action it must receive 
authorisation from Security Council.185 An analysis of the repertoire of the practice of the Security 
Council indicates that this authorisation has to be given prior the enforcement action.186 
Nevertheless, scholars have indicated otherwise. The authorisation requirement need not be prior. 
An interpretation of ECOWAS’ 1990 intervention in Liberia which Security Council acquiesced 
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by commending ECOWAS’ effort to restore peace, security and stability in Liberia.187 This 
interpretation is yet to be reflected in the Security Council. Most of its members still insist that 
authorisation has to be prior.188 
 
4.3 Evolution of cooperation between UN and Regional organisations 
The Cold War had impaired the proper use of Chapter VIII. After the Cold War, United Nations 
became financially strained.189 Member states were also not willing to contribute troops in high 
numbers for peace-keeping activities.190 This led to United Nations considering how it could work 
with regional organisations to share this load.191 The Secretary-General examined this issue and 
released a report Agenda for Peace192 with more convincing reasons as to why United Nations 
should rely on regional organisations.193 
The report first considered what regional arrangements or agencies are as the Charter of the United 
Nations does not provide a precise definition.194  According to the report the lack of the precise 
definition allows useful flexibility for undertakings by a group of states to deal with a matter 
appropriate for regional action.195 These associations could include treaty-based organizations, 
regional organizations for mutual security and defence, organizations for general regional 
development or for cooperation on a particular economic topic or function, and groups created to 
deal with a specific political, economic or social issue of current concern.196 
This was also a new era, ushered in by the end of the Cold War, regional arrangements or agencies 
could now render great service if their activities were undertaken in a manner consistent with the 
Purposes and Principles of the Charter, and if their relationship with United Nations is governed 
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by Chapter VIII.197 The report was not going to set forth any formal pattern of relationship between 
regional organizations and the United Nations or call for any specific division of labour. 
Nevertheless, it recognized that regional arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a 
potential that should be utilized for preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-
conflict peace building. Maintenance of international peace and security would still primarily be a 
responsibility of Security Council. With regional action, as a matter of decentralization, delegation 
and cooperation, to not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense 
of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.198 Regional organizations 
participating in complementarity efforts with the United Nations in joint undertakings would 
encourage states outside the region to act supportively.199  And where the Security Council chooses 
specifically to authorize a regional arrangement or organization to take the lead in addressing a 
crisis, it would lend the weight of the United Nations to the legitimacy of the regional effort.200 
A year after the report by the Secretary-General, the General Assembly adopted the declaration on 
the Enhancement of Cooperation between the United Nation and Regional Arrangements or 
Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security.201 States declared that the 
Security Council shall utilize regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its 
authority.202 
In 2005, The High-level Panel,203 the Secretary-General in his report In Larger Freedom,204 and 
the World Summit called for a stronger relationship between the United Nations and regional and 
sub-regional organisations pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter.205 As a response to the World 
Summit document, the Security Council passed its first resolution on cooperation with regional 
and sub-regional organizations.206 
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 Through this resolution, the Security Council invited regional and sub-regional organizations with 
a capacity for conflict prevention or peacekeeping to place such capacities in the framework of the 
United Nations Standby Arrangements System.207 The resolution urged all States and relevant 
international organizations to contribute to strengthening the capacity of regional and sub-regional 
organizations, including through human, technical and financial assistance.208 Furthermore, the 
Security Council, emphasised that it was important to develop the ability of regional organizations 
to deploy peacekeeping forces rapidly. To support UN peacekeeping operations or other Security 
Council mandated operations.209 The Security Council called for better communication between 
the UN and regional and sub-regional organizations; it recalled the obligation for regional 
organization to keep the Security Council fully informed under Article 54 of the UN Charter.210 
The Security Council also requested the UN Secretary-General to report on the opportunities and 
challenges involved and to explore the possibility of framework agreements on cooperation.211 
A year later, the Secretary- General published his Report212, A Regional- Global Security 
Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities.213 In the report, he acknowledged the fact UN was 
not equipped to handle every crisis.214 If peace and security were to be maintained, UN had to 
partner with regional and intergovernmental organisations.215 The report examined the history of 
cooperation and current cooperation between UN and regional organisations.216This led to 
proposals for the establishment of a more effective partnership, based on a clear division of labour 
that reflects the comparative advantage of each organization in conflict prevention, peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peace building.217 There is also development of a programme of action for 
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capacity building, especially in Africa.218 This was an attempt by UN in exploring cooperation on 
standby arrangements and rapid deployment.219 
The Security Council holds annual meetings with representatives of regional organizations to 
consider various aspects of cooperation.220 Also it has issued statements calling for increased 
cooperation based on complementarity and the comparative advantages of the different regional 
organisations.221 This is because regional organisations have the advantage of proximity to threats, 
a greater understanding of them and they are in a better position to detect early symptoms of 
conflict acting promptly.222 When UN is not able to act regional organisations may provide a rapid 
response.223 However, regional organisations may lack the capacity to sustain these operations.224 
As such it may be necessary for UN to step in when the threat goes beyond regional capabilities.225 
Nevertheless, some warn that there can be no enforcement action without prior Security Council 
authorization.226 Doesn’t this negate the argument of regional organisations having a comparative 
advantage? 
4.4 Conclusion 
As seen in this chapter use of force by regional organisations against a UN member state without 
prior Security Council authorisation is prima facie in violation of Article 2(4) of UN Charter. But 
African regional organizations have already taken a leading role in some conflicts without Security 
Council authorization.227 Consequently, would it be inappropriate to say that the UN should stop 
African states from policing their continent in a manner consistent with their customs and needs?228 
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5. PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN AFRICA 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter three we looked at UN’s peace and security framework. Concluding that use of force 
against a UN member state without Security Council authorisation is generally prohibited. 
However, UN has been encouraging cooperation from regional organisations in maintenance of 
peace and security as seen in chapter four. Arguing that they are better suited to take enforcement 
action in case of conflicts in their regions. 
This chapter reviews practice of ECOWAS and AU that espouse enforcement action. It examines 
the coordination between regional organisations and the Security Council during conflicts. In 
reviewing the practice of ECOWAS and AU, this chapter places particular emphasis on 
enforcement action that comes in the wake of the organisations establishment of treaty-based right 
to intervene. The first part focuses on ECOWAS looking at the various conflicts and how they led 
to formation of security laws as a solution. Then in the second part, a brief analysis of AU’s peace 
and security framework. 
 
5.2 Evolution of Security Regionalism in West Africa 
5.2.1 Early Attempts 
Conflict and instability in West Africa in 1990s and 2000s made leaders realize peace and security 
was paramount if they were to achieve regional economic prosperity.229 They first adopted nascent 
security protocols in 1978 and the region now has elaborate conflict resolution and security 
mechanisms.230 The initial 1975 ECOWAS treaty did not provide for a security role.231 It is conflict 
and political instability in several member states that made the regional body see the need to add 
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a defence protocol. Portuguese mercenaries attempted to invade Guinea while Benin was attacked 
by mercenaries.232 There were also military coups in the region.233 Due to this external aggression 
and military coups ECOWAS leaders adopted measures to ensure security in the region. The Non-
aggression treaty was adopted in 1978.234 This treaty called on members to refrain from the threat 
and use of force or aggression against each other.235 The Non-aggression treaty was weak as it 
failed to provide for a mechanism in case of a breach.236 ECOWAS leaders then adopted the 
Mutual Assistance on Defence protocol.237 Member states were to assist in defence of any armed 
threat or aggression against another member state.238 As it was considered as constituting a threat 
or aggression against entire community.239 The Mutual Assistance on Defence protocol was more 
advanced as it stipulated instances where action could be taken and had a response mechanism.240 
However, it failed as it mainly focused on external threats and ignored the numerous coups and 
internal conflicts in the region.241 
5.2.2 Major Conflicts  
In 1989 Civil War began in Liberia when Charles Taylor led a group of rebels from Nimba County 
in Liberia/Cote d’Ivoire into Liberia with the aim of ousting Doe.242 The group called themselves 
the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).243 They reached the capital city of Monrovia in 
June the same year but failed to force Doe out of the presidency.244 This eventually ended up in a 
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full scale war involving various rebel groups that lasted for seven years.245 The effect of the 
fighting was felt across the neighbouring states affecting industries such as tourism and regional 
trade.246 ECOWAS heads of states formed a five member Standing Mediation Committee tasked 
with identifying a peaceful solution to the crisis.247 Mediation failed and the SMC established and 
deployed the ECOWAS Monitoring Group a peace keeping force.248 After two years ECOWAS 
eventually stabilized the situation.249 On 19 November 1992 the UNSC adopted resolution 788 
that called for the restoration of peace and a weapons embargo against Liberia and authorizing 
ECOWAS to enforce its terms.250  The UNSC through this resolution affirmed the legality of 
ECOWAS’s actions in Liberia.251 This confirmed that an intervention taken outside the authority 
of the UNSC could be lawful depending on the reasons for intervention.252 
In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG reinstated the ousted President Kabbah and acted as the de facto army. 
Kabbah was toppled from power by a military coup and he fled to Guinea after requesting 
ECOWAS to intervene.253 OAU requested ECOWAS to intervene to restore Kabbah’s regime to 
power.254 The UN Secretary General also requested ECOWAS to intervene.255 The first 
intervention was by Nigerian forces who were met with strong resistance at first but later would 
push back and secure some of the areas.256 ECOWAS on 30 August 1991 during its summit it 
finally gave ECOMOG the mandate to enforce sanctions against the rebels and restore law and 
order in the country.257 The UNSC then supported this efforts by adopting Resolution 1132.258 
5.2.3 Institutionalizing Conflict Resolution in West Africa 
The first serious attempt to establish a security mechanism is in the revised ECOWAS treaty of 
1993.259 This was after having to intervene in the situation in Liberia a few months before. The 
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contracting parties agreed to maintain peace, stability and security.260 They also agreed to promote 
democratic systems of government in member states.261 The states would also provide assistance 
for the observance of democratic elections, establish a regional peace and security observation and 
peace keeping forces where appropriate.262 The treaty also provides for other protocols with 
additional provisions governing political cooperation and regional peace and stability.263 
ECOWAS then adopted the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and security in 1999.264 Months after the intervention in 
Sierra Leone. Aimed at further implementation of the revised ECOWAS treaty. This was later 
followed by a supplementary protocol to this protocol in 2000 on Democracy and Good 
Governance.265  
The ECOWAS Mechanism recognizes that central to development of West Africa is peace, 
security, stability democracy and good governance. Among its objectives266 the ones relevant to 
this research are: 
1. Prevent, manage and resolve internal and inter-state conflicts under the conditions in 
paragraph 46 of the framework. 
2. Implement relevant provisions of Article 58 of the Revised ECOWAS treaty.267 
3. Maintain and consolidate peace, security and stability within the community. 
4. Constitute and deploy a civilian and military force to maintain or restore peace within the 
sub-region whenever the need arises. 
The protocol establishes various institutions tasked with achieving its objectives. The Authority 
which comprises of the various members heads of state, Mediation and Security Council, 
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Executive Secretariat.268 It goes further and states that any other institution may be formed to 
achieve the protocols objectives.269  All forms of intervention are authorized by the Mediation and 
Security Council.270 It mainly decides on the deployment of political and military missions. Organs 
are established to assist the Mediation and Security Council with this function.271 The Defence and 
Security Commission which formulates the military mandate, determines composition of 
contingents and appoints the force commander.272 It mainly comprises of the Chiefs of Defence of 
the member countries.273 There is also the ECOWAS Cease Fire Monitoring Group which is the 
military force of the sub-regional organization with functions such as peace keeping and 
restoration and preventive deployment.274 
There is also a provision permitting ECOWAS to support processes that aim at restoring political 
authority at the same time as the development of respect of human rights, enhancement of the rule 
of law and the judiciary.275 The support may include preparation, organization, monitoring and 
management of electoral processes with the cooperation of regional and international 
organisations. In the implementation of its mechanism, ECOWAS is to cooperate with both the 
AU and the UN.276 
The supplementary protocol to the mechanism states constitutional principles shared by all the 
member states.277 Among them are that power should be acquired through free and fair elections278 
and a policy of zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means.279 
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Where democracy is abruptly brought to an end or where there are human rights violations it 
provides that ECOWAS may impose sanctions on such a state.280 In such a situation the sub-
regional body on the recommendation of the Mediation and Security Council may take the 
measures stipulated in article 45 of the 1999 Protocol which I have also discussed in this section.281 
 
5.3 African Union Security Framework 
 The principle of non-interference has been reformulated in the AU.282 It only applies to 
interference in the internal affairs of a member state by another member.283 Unilateral interventions 
are prohibited and not collective interventions.284 The Constitutive Act of the African Union 
provides for the right of a member state to request intervention. Article 4 of the Act provides: 
“h) The right of AU to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in 
respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity. 
j) The right of member states to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and 
security.” 
The General Assembly can therefore decide on intervention on two levels. First on its own 
initiative285 and secondly at the request of a member state.286 The latter has been interpreted by a 
scholar to mean restriction is not placed on the concerned member state. Any member state may 
make an intervention request.287  
Incorporation of the right to intervention in the Constitutive Act may have been influenced by two 
major factors according to Kioko. These are past African experiences and President Museveni’s 
maiden speech.288 OAU had failed to intervene when massive human rights violations were being 
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committed by Idi Amin in Uganda and Bokasu in Central African Republic in the 70’s. They also 
failed to intervene in Rwanda when they had a genocide in 1994.289 In his maiden speech to the 
ordinary session of Heads of State and Government of OAU in 1986, President Museveni had the 
following to say: 
“Over a period of 20 years three quarters of a million Ugandans perished at the hands of 
governments that should have protected their lives (…) I must state that Ugandans (…) felt a deep 
sense of betrayal that most of Africa kept silent (…) the reason for not condemning such massive 
crimes had supposedly been a desire not to interfere in the internal affairs of a Member State, in 
accordance with the Charters of the OAU and the United Nations. We do not accept this reasoning 
because in the same organs there are explicit laws that enunciate the sanctity and inviolability of 
human life.”290     
 
In July 2003 AU adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act. Among the 
amendments proposed was an addition to Article 4(h) to include “as well as a serious threat to 
legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the member states of the African Union upon 
recommendation of the Peace and Security Council.”291  Therefore, the Peace and Security Council 
determines grave circumstances have occurred or are about to occur in a member state then 
recommends intervention by the Union.292 These grave circumstances that may justify intervention 
are limited to war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity taking place.293  The Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government then makes the final decision on the matter.294 
As seen earlier regional organizations require authorization from UNSC before undertaking an 
enforcement action. AU has contemplated this by stipulating an article on its relationship with UN 
and other international organisations.295 AU recognizes that UNSC has primary responsibility to 
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maintain peace and security and will closely work with it.296 Also that AU may rely on UN for 
financial, logistical and military support while undertaking enforcement action.297 This mainly 
because of the financial limitations of AU as enforcement actions are costly.298 
Nonetheless, it has been argued that in case of hesitation, delay or failure by UNSC to act on its 
own or to authorize the AU to act the Assembly of Heads of State and Government would muster 
the requisite political will to undertake on its own prompt and targeted military intervention in a 
member state.299 This has been argued by some authors, seen earlier, as prima facie a violation of 
article 53 of UN Charter but we have arguing differently. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
UNSC has on many occasions failed to decide or is disinclined to act in the face of conflicts in 
Africa. This has led to regional organisations in Africa to incorporate treaty-based right to take 
enforcement action to restore peace and security. It is through this right that regional organisations 
consider themselves having a responsibility to maintain peace and security in the region. Taking 
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The relationship between chapter VII and chapter VIII of UN Charter has not been studied as 
deeply as the individual chapters. Yet understanding this relationship is crucial for the maintenance 
of security in the world. The relationship between UNSC and regional organisations in 
maintenance of peace and security has evolved. It is not the same as envisaged by the drafters of 
UN Charter as this research has attempted to show. 
6.2 Restating the initial Problem 
This research proceeded from the hypothesis. Proximity to conflicts in Africa makes regional 
organisations most suitable to maintain peace and security in Africa. Also because Article 3 and 
Article 25 of the Protocol on Mechanism for Conflict Prevention permit ECOWAS to use force 
without prior UNSC authorisation, they violate Article 53 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
And UNSC’s silence, open support and not objecting to the use of force by African states reflects 
the futility of the prior authorization requirement in Article 53 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
6.3 Research Findings 
6.3.1 Peace and Security in Africa should be maintained by regional organisations  
UNSC is mainly composed of powerful states. Intervention by any of them is mostly in the guise 
of UNSC’s power over use of force. This power stems from the primary responsibility of 
maintaining peace and security. Thus most of them seem not to be confined by international norms. 
They can easily get away with it. Powerful states will be held accountable once this veil they hide 
under is removed. Not forgetting that colonisation itself was undertaken as a form of intervention 
by powerful states. 
Also UNSC due to its detachment (in the sense of members and proximity) from Africa is slow to 
take enforcement actions. In some instances, such as Rwanda, it completely failed to take 
enforcement action to restore peace. It is due to this that African states agreed that they shall never 
again watch a country burn and agitated for a right of intervention through regional organisations. 
6.3.2 African states prioritize human rights values over sovereignty based values 
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African states through regional treaties have agreed to take enforcement action to safeguard human 
rights and restore peace and security. This means that within member states of the regional 
organisations human rights abuses and repressive regimes cannot be cloaked by state sovereignty.  
6.3.3 Regional organisations determine if there is a threat to peace in their regions 
Before resorting to an enforcement action there is need to determine that there is a threat to peace. 
One of the reasons behind UNSC’s prior authorisation requirement was so that UNSC could 
determine if there was a threat to peace. This is part of UNSC’s primary responsibility to maintain 
peace and security. However, regional organisations have been taking enforcement actions without 
UNSC’s prior authorisation. This is after they determine that there is a threat to peace and security 
in their regions.  
6.3.4 The Relationship between UN and Regional organisations in enforcement action 
is one of resource support 
Enforcement actions require a lot of resources to sustain. Regional organizations in Africa are 
under resourced. For enforcement actions by regional organisations to be successful they will need 
support from UN as envisaged in article 54 of UN Charter. 
6.4 Conclusion 
It is time for states as the true legislators of international law to review the relationship between 
regional organisations and UNSC. This relationship has evolved and it is not the way it had been 
envisaged by the drafters of the UN Charter. 
 
6.5 Recommendations 
Maintenance of peace and security should be primarily a role of regional organisations. This may 
mean a proposition to amend the UN Charter or the same becoming law through custom. The 
former being harder than the latter. 
Regional bodies should no longer require prior authorisation before taking enforcement actions. 
This should only be the case if the enforcement action is undertaken under the authority of a 
regional organisation.  
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Due to the huge financial resources needed to undertake enforcement actions regional 
organisations need to work with UN. UN would provide the necessary support for undertaking 
enforcement actions. 
6.6 Recommendations for Further Research 
The research has mainly focused on state practice which is one limb of customary international 
law. Therefore there is need to examine whether these developments may amount to customary 
international law. 
UNSC’s primary responsibility to maintain peace and security is what gives it authority to make 
referrals to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The argument of this research is that regional 
organisations are better suited to have the primary responsibility of maintaining peace and security. 
In the field of international criminal law it would raise a question. Whether these regional 
organisations by virtue of having primary responsibility have a justification to propose an 
amendment to the Rome Statute. The amendment would allow regional organisations to refer and 
defer cases to the ICC. Perhaps this would be a better solution for African states who were 
disgruntled by UNSC’s failure to defer the Al Bashir case. Better than the proposed African Court 
with an international criminal law division. There is need to research on this before making   the 
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